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This study shows that the relative amount of capital and risk-taking compared to peers has 
influence on the funding cost of financial institutions. This suggests that these two factors could 
work as tools for achieving financial stability by means of self-regulatory practices given that 
financial institutions would have incentives to increase capital and refrain from taking 
excessive risk. Besides contributing to the policy-making debate on the viability of market 
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Arguments supporting the pertinence of market discipline in the banking system imply, among 
other issues, that financial institutions would have incentives to hold more capital and avoid 
excessive risk-taking. One of the reasons for this would be the possible reduction in funding 
cost (e.g. interest rates paid to depositors and other debtholders). The literature dealing with 
either market discipline or funding cost does not present empirical evidence of the simultaneous 
importance of capital and risk-taking in this context. The former stream of studies has not 
specifically investigated the two aforementioned factors(1,2,3) while the latter has shown a link 
between bank solvency (which involves capital) and funding cost but has not disentangled the 
specific roles of capital and risk-taking in a same framework(4,5,6,7,8). 
The lack of empirical evidence showing the potential impact of capital holdings and risk-taking 
behaviour on funding costs in banks is likely due to the endogenous nature of the variables 
considered. That is, capital ratios and risk-taking may be driven by omitted factors that also 
affect funding costs. This paper contributes to fill this gap in the literature by using exogenous 
indicators of financial institutions’ capital ratios and risk-taking in comparison with their peers 
to investigate whether higher capital levels and less risk-taking lead to lower funding costs. In 
general, this possibility is confirmed by the empirical results presented ahead, which therefore 
support market discipline arguments in favour of self-regulation in banking (at least as far as 
funding costs are concerned).  
This study is of interest especially to bankers and financial regulators. The former can learn 
whether increasing capital ratios and reducing risk-taking vis-à-vis their competitors could 
actually result in lower funding costs. The latter can use the empirical evidence presented here 





2. Data and method 
The sample used consists of annual data from January 1990 to December 2018 for 17,430 
active and inactive U.S. deposit-taking institutions (commercial banks, savings banks, and 
savings and loan associations). This refers to all institutions in the S&P Global Market 
Intelligence (SNL) platform with the data necessary for the analyses.  
Since depositors and other debtholders could evaluate financial institutions following 
alternative criteria, different exogenous ranking measures regarding capital level and risk-
taking are built. The empirical exercise initially considers indicators given by the percentiles 
(rank-order positions) of institution i’s capital (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐
) and risk-taking (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐
) at 
time t in the respective distributions of the banking sector. This implies that debtholders would 
compare the relative position of financial institutions in terms of capital holdings and risk taken 
when deciding the return they would require in light of the risk faced. Additional indicators 
following other comparison rules are tested in robustness analyses. 
Apart from these measures comprising the whole banking system (as if every institution was 
compared nationwide), for each factor, capital and risk-taking, specific measures for subsets of 
institutions clustered by primary regulator and FDIC supervisory region are also built. In order 
to ease the presentation of the results, these indicators have an additional superscript ‘sim’, 





respectively to the position of bank i's capital holdings and risk-taking in the rankings of 
institutions similar to it.  
Funding cost is estimated according to the following model: 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +




where the subscripts i and t represent bank i and time (year) t.  For convenience, the subscripts 
i, t and t-1 are not included in the description of the variables ahead. μ and  indicate bank- and 
time-fixed effects, respectively(9). ε is the error term. The dependent variable FC is one of four 
types of funding cost: cost of interest-bearing deposits (CD, the total cost of deposits divided 
by the average volume of interest-bearing deposits), cost of interest-bearing borrowings (CB, 
the total interest expense on borrowings divided by average interest-bearing debt excluding 
deposits), cost of interest-bearing liabilities (CL, the total interest expense as a percent of the 
average of all interest-bearing liabilities, including deposits and the other types of debt), and 
cost of funds (CF, the total interest expense divided by the sum of the average of all interest-
bearing liabilities and noninterest-bearing deposits).  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑑 and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑, the main covariates of interest, refer to one of the variants of the capital 
holdings and risk-taking indicators, respectively. In the first measure, the capital factor 
observed by debtholders is represented by total equity divided by total assets. The second 
measure, a proxy of banks’ risk-taking, is calculated as risk-weighted assets divided by total 
assets.  
Other factors that could impact banks’ funding cost are also considered. Size (the natural 
logarithm of total assets), for instance, could affect funding cost due to the market expectation 
of reduced risk in the case of institutions perceived as too-big-to-fail. IntInc (interest income 
received divided by average assets) could impact the resources available for the payment of 
interest on debt. DepRatio (ratio of deposits to total assets) helps in checking whether debt 
composition plays any role in the interest paid by institutions. For example, it could be the case 
that banks relying more on deposits as a source of funding need (are willing) to pay more for 
them. NPL (non-performing loans divided by total assets) would show if losses interfere with 
the interest rates institutions agree to pay on their deposits. These independent variables are 
lagged one period behind the dependent variable not only to rule out the possibility of reverse 
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causality but also to represent the fact that debtholders make decisions on their investments 
using information made available at the end of the previous period (year). Given that the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act of January 2010 created the possibility of bail-
ins, a Bail_in dummy is included in the model (equal to 1 for years 2010 onwards and 0 
otherwise) with a view to controlling for the impact of this possibility on funding costs. 
Except for the ranking indicators and the Bail_in dummy, all the other accounting variables are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles to avoid distorted results due to outliers. 
The time-fixed effects aim at capturing factors possibly changing over time and equally 
affecting funding costs of all banks in each period. This could be the case of, for instance, 
macroeconomic factors (inflation, GDP growth, risk-free rate, etc.) and regulatory events(10). 
The bank-fixed effects refer to non-time-varying banks’ features possibly driving funding cost. 
It is important to note that unobserved time-varying banks’ characteristics would not impact 
the results because, by definition, the main independent variables (ranking indicators) are not 
related to those characteristics. Given that any version of the indicators regarding bank i is not 
exclusively determined by the capital holdings and risk-taking of that particular bank but 
greatly depends on all the other banks, those measures are independent of unobserved factors 
of bank i (e.g. reputation or management capability) impacting its costs of funding. Therefore, 
the conclusions of the analyses presented show a direct effect of the indicators on the funding 
costs analysed. 
 
3. Results and discussions 
The summary statistics of the data used in the analyses can be found in Table 1. The values 
presented do not indicate any important issues that could have affected the study’s results. 
Table 2 shows the correlations among the variables, which do not suggest the possibility of 
severe multicollinearity. The few pairs that exhibit relatively high correlations refer to variables 
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not simultaneously included in a same regression (either two dependent variables or two 
ranking indicators not used together). 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
The baseline results are presented in Table 3, where Panels A, B and C refer to the whole 
sample, small institutions and large institutions, respectively. In general, deposit-taking 
institutions with less capital than their peers in a year tend to have higher funding costs over 
the subsequent year. Costs of deposits are an exception for small institutions and when 
analysing the whole sample(11). In the former case, the coefficient of the capital ranking 
indicator is negative as expected but not significant. These specific results are therefore driven 
by small institutions and suggest that their depositors (most of them small, unsophisticated 
ones) do not take banks’ capital levels into account when accepting interest rates paid on their 
deposits. Nevertheless, as shown in Panel C, capital levels remain important to large banks 
regarding this particular measure of funding cost.  
In terms of relative risk-taking, except for costs of funds in large institutions, the higher the 
risk taken in a period, the higher the interest rates paid by institutions in the next period. 
Assuming that banks pay as little as possible in order to attract the funding necessary for their 
operations, these results indicate that risk-taking is seen as a signal of potential distress in the 
future. Hence, debtholders require higher return to invest in riskier institutions.  
In sum, the results suggest that both capital ratio and risk-taking matter in terms of funding 
costs. Using the most comprehensive measure (cost of funds) and ranking indicators 
(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐
 and  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐
) for the whole sample as an example, it can be seen that going 
up one position in the capital ranking or going down one position in the risk-taking ranking 
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would lead to a reduction of 0.10% or 0.46% per year in funding costs, respectively – see 
column (7) in Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4. Robustness tests  
Instead of looking at capital levels and risk-taking separately, an alternative would be to 
consider the ratio of capital to risk-taking as a possible factor used by debtholders to compare 
banks and decide on the acceptable return. The coefficients of the capital/risk-taking ranking 
indicator are negative and significant for all funding cost measures (see Table 4, where Panels 
A, B and C refer to the whole sample, small institutions and large institutions, respectively). 
This is in line with the main baseline results in the previous section and suggests that, by 
increasing capital in relation to the risk taken more than its competitors do, a bank can achieve 
lower funding costs.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
A different cut-off in terms of total assets (U$ 3 billion) to classify financial institutions as 
small or large was tested. The results confirm all initial findings. 
The potential impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on the original results is tested in 
further analyses where the sample period is split into pre-GFC (before 2008) and post-GFC 
(after 2008). The results concerning risk-taking are confirmed for both periods as seen in Panels 
A and B of Table 5. When it comes to capital ratios, the baseline findings for most of the cost 
measures only match those of the post-crisis period, suggesting that the relative position of 
capital levels have only become important after the GFC when depositors and investors became 
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aware that the level of capital held by many financial institutions could not be sufficient to 
cover their losses. Hence, in the post-crisis period, those institutions with relatively low capital 
levels have been required to pay higher funding costs. The cost of borrowings is the only type 
of debt for which the initial results remain valid in both periods. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Additional ranking indicators are built based on the distance between the capital ratio and risk-
taking of an institution in the respective mean and the median in the banking system. As before, 
these measures are calculated for the whole system and separately for institutions overseen by 
a same primary regulator and in the same FDIC region. No pattern was identified in these 
additional analyses, indicating that these rankings are not suitable to show the presence or the 
absence of a relationship between capital ratios or risk-taking positions and funding costs.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper shows evidence that the level of capital holdings and risk-taking in financial 
institutions compared to their peers affects funding costs. Higher positions in the capital 
ranking and lower positions in the risk-taking ranking lead to lower funding costs. This 
suggests that financial institutions would have incentives to increase their capital ratios and 
reduce excessive risk-taking with a view to reduce their funding costs. This adds to the 
literature supporting the relevance of self-regulatory strategies such as Hovakimian and 
Kane(1), Barth et al.(2), and Flannery and Rangan(3) . 
Another contribution of this study is to present new questions whose answers would help 
financial institutions and regulators to understand unexplored issues concerning funding costs. 
For instance, it is recognised that the discussion above does not explain a few differences found 
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across some the variables such as the fact that the cost of deposits is impacted by the position 
in the risk-taking ranking but not in the capital ranking. In this sense, the results reported here 
point to specific issues that deserve future analyses in this field. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
CD 276,612 0.0281 0.0304 0.0185 0.0000 0.0761 
CB 276,339 0.0275 0.0226 0.0299 0.0000 0.0741 
CL 276,596 0.0287 0.0311 0.0185 0.0032 0.0767 
CF 276,607 0.0281 0.0290 0.0177 0.0021 0.0825 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Cap) 276,616 0.5001 0.5000 0.2887 0.0001 1.0000 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Risk) 276,616 0.5001 0.5000 0.2887 0.0001 1.0000 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Cap) 276,616 0.5017 0.5015 0.2887 0.0005 1.0000 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Risk) 276,616 0.5017 0.5015 0.2887 0.0005 1.0000 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Cap/Risk) 274,408 0.5001 0.5000 0.2887 0.0001 1.0000 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Cap/Risk) 274,408 0.5017 0.5015 0.2887 0.0005 1.0000 
Size 276,616 11.6507 11.5064 1.3775 8.6199 17.4991 
IntInc 276,616 0.0568 0.0617 0.0263 0.0000 0.1223 
DepRatio 276,604 0.7518 0.8552 0.2737 0.0000 0.9561 
NPL 276,616 0.0087 0.0036 0.0147 0.0000 0.1532 
Bail_in 276,616 0.2324 0.0000 0.4224 0.0000 1.0000 
Obs is the number of observations. Std Dev, Min and Max stand for standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum, respectively. CD is the cost of interest-bearing deposits; CB is the cost of interest-bearing 
borrowings; CL is the cost of interest-bearing liabilities; CF is cost of funds; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Cap) and 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Risk) are the capital and risk indicators for the whole banking system, respectively; 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Cap) and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Risk) are the capital and risk indicators for similar institutions, 
respectively; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Cap/Risk) and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Cap/Risk), used in robustness tests, are the risk 
indicators based on the ratio of capital to risk-taking considering the whole banking system and similar 
institutions, respectively. The method of calculation of the previous variables are presented in Section 
2. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; IntInc is the interest income received on assets divided 
by average assets; DepRatio is the ratio of deposits to total assets; NPL is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total assets; Bail_in is a dummy indicating the years when bail-in became a possibility.    
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Table 2. Correlation across the main variables used in the analyses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) CD 1.0000               
(2) CB 0.2738 1.0000              
(3) CL 0.9934 0.2999 1.0000             
(4) CF 0.6916 0.3480 0.6920 1.0000            
(5) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Cap) -0.0485 -0.1552 -0.0546 -0.0286 1.0000           
(6) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Risk) 0.0879 0.1649 0.0895 0.0921 -0.1435 1.0000          
(7) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Cap) -0.0478 -0.1523 -0.0530 -0.0383 0.9764 -0.1592 1.0000         
(8) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Risk) 0.0861 0.1620 0.0895 0.0847 -0.1621 0.9423 -0.1647 1.0000        
(9) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Cap/Risk) -0.0743 -0.2010 -0.0796 -0.0601 0.8025 -0.6517 0.7953 -0.6363 1.0000       
(10) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Cap/Risk) -0.0721 -0.1947 -0.0776 -0.0639 0.7968 -0.6201 0.8138 -0.6497 0.9742 1.0000      
(11) Size -0.1492 0.1511 -0.1291 -0.1915 -0.2103 0.1927 -0.1976 0.2140 -0.2654 -0.2648 1.0000     
(12) IntInc 0.3258 0.1564 0.3149 0.4729 -0.0360 0.3038 -0.0837 0.2255 -0.1946 -0.1888 -0.1859 1.0000    
(13) DepRatio -0.0505 -0.0545 -0.0713 -0.0573 -0.0920 0.2352 -0.1340 0.1536 -0.1736 -0.1652 -0.0846 0.6726 1.0000   
(14) NPL -0.1036 0.0075 -0.1024 -0.0772 -0.1277 0.1502 -0.1149 0.1483 -0.1860 -0.1711 0.1204 -0.0962 -0.0112 1.0000  
(15) Bail_in -0.5996 -0.2414 -0.5995 -0.6492 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 0.2360 -0.3596 0.1135 0.2079 1.0000 
CD is the cost of interest-bearing deposits; CB is the cost of interest-bearing borrowings; CL is the cost of interest-bearing liabilities; CF is cost of funds; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Cap) and 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Risk) are the capital and risk indicators for the whole banking system, respectively; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Cap) and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Risk) are the capital and risk indicators for similar 
institutions, respectively; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(Cap/Risk) and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚(Cap/Risk), used in robustness tests, are the risk indicators based on the ratio of capital to risk-taking considering 
the whole banking system and similar institutions, respectively. The method of calculation of the previous variables are presented in Section 2. Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets; IntInc is the interest income received on assets divided by average assets; DepRatio is the ratio of deposits to total assets; NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total assets; Bail_in is a dummy indicating the years when bail-in became a possibility. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.    
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Table 3. The impact of capital and risk-taking indicators on different measures of funding cost 
Dependent variable Cost of Deposits Cost of Borrowings Cost of Liabilities Cost of Funds 
Ranking indicators 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: whole sample 
         
CapIndt-1 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0080*** -0.0077*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
RiskIndt-1 0.0054*** 0.0046*** 0.0092*** 0.0079*** 0.0055*** 0.0047*** 0.0046*** 0.0038*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
         
No. of  Observations 259,150 259,150 258,904 258,904 259,134 259,134 259,150 259,150 
No. of banks 17,389 17,389 17,388 17,388 17,388 17,388 17,389 17,389 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared 0.8253 0.8248 0.1678 0.1667 0.8224 0.8221 0.7681 0.7675 
         
 Panel B: small institutions 
         
CapIndt-1 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0067*** -0.0065*** -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
RiskIndt-1 0.0054*** 0.0045*** 0.0088*** 0.0077*** 0.0054*** 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0038*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
         
No. of  Observations 241,079 241,079 240,845 240,845 241,066 241,066 241,077 241,077 
No. of banks 16,768 16,768 16,767 16,767 16,767 16,767 16,768 16,768 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared 0.8250 0.8242 0.1653 0.1643 0.8204 0.8197 0.7661 0.7652 




Table 3 (continued). The impact of capital and risk-taking indicators on different measures of funding cost 
Dependent variable Cost of Deposits Cost of Borrowings Cost of Liabilities Cost of Funds 
Ranking indicators 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel C: large institutions 
         
CapIndt-1 -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0036*** -0.0029*** -0.0020*** -0.0019*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
RiskIndt-1 0.0032*** 0.0029*** 0.0057*** 0.0058*** 0.0033*** 0.0030*** 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
         
No. of  Observations 18,071 18,071 18,059 18,059 18,068 18,068 18,073 18,073 
No. of banks 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared 0.8510 0.8512 0.5365 0.5376 0.8671 0.8675 0.8330 0.8328 
This table shows the regression results of the baseline model. Panels A, B and C refer to the whole sample, small institutions (total assets < U$ 1 billion) and large institutions (total assets > U$ 1 
billion), respectively. Four dependent variables are considered: Cost of Deposits in columns (1) to (2), Cost of Borrowings in columns (3) and (4), Cost of Liabilities in columns (5) and (6), and 
Cost of Funds in columns (7) and (8). Their definitions are presented in Section 2. For each of them, two types of ranking indicators are used: Indperc in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) represents the 
capital and the risk indicators based on the percentiles of the respective measures of interest in the distribution of all institutions; Indperc,sim  in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) differs from the previous 
measure in that it is calculated for subgroups of institutions with a same primary regulator and located in a same FDIC regulatory region. Details on the calculations of these indicators are presented 
in Section 2. CapIndt-1 and RiskIndt-1 are our main independent variables and refer to capital and risk-taking indicators, respectively. The control variables, whose coefficients are omitted due to 
space constraints are bank size, the ratio of interest rate income to average assets, the ratio of deposits to total assets, and the amount of non-performing loans divided by total assets, and a dummy 
for years when bail-ins have become possible. All the independent variables are lagged one period in comparison with the dependent variable in order to preclude the possibility of reverse causality. 
The coefficient of the intercept term is also omitted. Robust standard errors, clustered by banks, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. To help with a quick assessment of the 
significance of the coefficients, we follow the convention in most papers and use *** and * to indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. ** is not used given that 




Table 4. The impact of the ratio of capital to risk-taking indicators on different measures of funding cost 
Dependent variable Cost of Deposits Cost of Borrowings Cost of Liabilities Cost of Funds 
Ranking indicators 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: whole sample 
         
Cap_to_Risk_Indt-1 -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0104*** -0.0097*** -0.0021*** -0.0019*** -0.0022*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
         
No. of  Observations 256,943 256,943 256,697 256,697 256,697 256,697 256,943 256,943 
No. of banks 17,389 17,389 17,388 17,388 17,388 17,388 17,389 17,389 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared 0.8707 0.8704 0.1835 0.1815 0.8761 0.8758 0.8231 0.8228 
         
 Panel B: small institutions 
         
Cap_to_Risk_Indt-1 -0.0017*** -0.0015*** -0.0093*** -0.0088*** -0.0019*** -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0017*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
         
No. of  Observations 238,965 238,965 238,731 238,731 238,952 238,952 238,963 238,963 
No. of banks 16,765 16,765 16,764 16,764 16,764 16,764 16,765 16,765 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared 0.8733 0.8729 0.1799 0.1783 0.8766 0.8762 0.8245 0.8241 




Table 4 (continued). The impact of the ratio of capital to risk-taking indicators on different measures of funding cost 
Dependent variable Cost of Deposits Cost of Borrowings Cost of Liabilities Cost of Funds 
Ranking indicators 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel C: large institutions 
         
Cap_to_Risk_Indt-1 -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0035*** -0.0031*** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
         
No. of  Observations 17,978 17,978 17,966 17,966 17,975 17,975 17,975 17,975 
No. of banks 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared 0.8675 0.8674 0.5543 0.5539 0.8879 0.8879 0.8469 0.8470 
This table shows the regression results of an alternative model where the main independent variable is an indicator based on the ranking of the capital to risk-taking ratio. Panels A, B and C refer 
to the whole sample, small institutions (total assets < U$ 1 billion) and large institutions (total assets > U$ 1 billion), respectively. Four dependent variables are considered: Cost of Deposits in 
columns (1) to (2), Cost of Borrowings in columns (3) and (4), Cost of Liabilities in columns (5) and (6), and Cost of Funds in columns (7) and (8). Their definitions are presented in Section 2. 
For each of them, two types of ranking indicators are used: Indperc in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) represents the capital and the risk indicators based on the percentiles of the respective measures 
of interest in the distribution of all institutions; Indperc,sim  in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) differs from the previous measure in that it is calculated for subgroups of institutions with a same primary 
regulator and located in a same FDIC regulatory region. Details on the calculations of these indicators are presented in Section 2. Cap_to_Risk_Indt-1, the ratio of capital to risk-taking, is our main 
independent variable. The control variables, whose coefficients are omitted due to space constraints are bank size, the ratio of interest rate income to average assets, the ratio of deposits to total 
assets, the amount of non-performing loans divided by total assets, and a dummy for years when bail-ins have become possible. All the independent variables are lagged one period in comparison 
with the dependent variable in order to preclude the possibility of reverse causality. The coefficient of the intercept term is also omitted. Robust standard errors, clustered by banks, are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. To help with a quick assessment of the significance of the coefficients, we follow the convention in most papers and use *** to indicate statistical 




Table 5. The impact of capital and risk-taking indicators on different measures of funding cost before and after the Global Financial Crisis 
Dependent variable Cost of Deposits Cost of Borrowings Cost of Liabilities Cost of Funds 
Ranking indicators 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐,𝑠𝑖𝑚 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: Pre-crisis 
         
CapIndt-1 0.0008*** 0.0008*** -0.0077*** -0.0073*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** -0.0001 <0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
RiskIndt-1 0.0043*** 0.0035*** 0.0099*** 0.0081*** 0.0045*** 0.0038*** 0.0039*** 0.0031*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
         
No. of  Observations 178,655 178,655 178,450 178,450 178,649 178,649 178,656 178,656 
No. of banks 17,050 17,050 17,049 17,049 17,049 17,049 17,050 17,050 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared 0.5456   0.5436 0.1101 0.1058 0.5348 0.5330 0.4347 0.4315 
         
 Panel B: Post-crisis 
         
CapIndt-1 -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0034*** -0.0032*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
RiskIndt-1 0.0014*** 0.0010*** 0.0010** 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
         
No. of  Observations 72,259 72,259 72,223 72,223 72,251 72,251 72,258 72,258 
No. of banks 8,078 8,078 8,078 8,078 8,078 8,078 8,078 8,078 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Overall R-squared 0.4880 0.4826 0.1126 0.1113 0.4998 0.4951 0.4551    0.4503 
         
This table presents the results of the baseline model for pre- and post-crisis subsamples. The four dependent variables and the two ranking indicators are the same ones shown 
in Table 3 (see further explanations therein).  *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. None of the coefficients is significant at the 10% level, so the 
single star * is not used. 
